What factors determine how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries choose to locate their offices and programs within a particular country? Are NGOs influenced primarily by the objective need of the people? Does their placement correspond with locations that are convenient and easy to live in for their staff? Do political considerations within the country strongly influence NGO program location? Using comprehensive data from the national NGO Coordination Board of Kenya, this paper answers these questions as they pertain to one country in sub-Saharan Africa. It finds that NGO location corresponds with objective levels of need in an area, as well as the relative ease of reaching these needy people. Political factors like patronage appear to have little or no significant influence.
Introduction
In the past two decades, the position of non-governmental organizations (NGOs 1 ) in developing countries around the world has shifted from that of minor and little-discussed players focusing on the welfare of the poor to major, central actors on the world stage of development, receiving, in some cases, more donor funds than their state counterparts (Chege 1999) . In sub-Saharan Africa, this shift arose in part from donor frustration with opaque and inefficient state-based systems for development, which spawned an interest in accountability and governance mechanisms involving non-state actors, including NGOs. NGOs have increasingly been seen as more efficient, effective, flexible and innovative than governments, to be other-oriented and ideologically committed to democracy and participatory pro-poor development, and to be more accountable and transparent than the government (Bratton 1989 , Fowler 1991 , Owiti et al 2004 . Significant research has been done to understand many implications of these changes. Often through the lens of analyzing state-NGO relations (Bratton 1989 , Broadhead 1987 , Clark 1995 , Kameri-Mbote 2000 , Sandberg 1994 , scholars have examined the growth and impact of NGOs on service provision and development (Kanyinga 1996 , Obiyan 2005 , Oyugi 2004 , Tripp 1994 , accountability (Edwards & Hulme 1996) local politics and collective action (Boulding & Gibson forthcoming) , governance (Grindle 2004 , Mercer 2003 , Swidler 2007 and sovereignty (Chege 1999) . However, to date, considerable research has focused on NGOs as an explanatory variable. 2 This paper takes another approach, asking not about NGOs' impacts, but about their initial placement. Specifically, it asks why NGOs choose to set up shop in the places where they do work, a crucial question around which there has been considerable conjecture, but scant data.
What factors determine where NGOs implement their programs on the ground? Do NGOs choose locations for their projects and offices based on objective need-based grounds, like poverty, illness, lack of education, or other such measures of relative deprivation? Or do other, less-altruistic factors more highly influence these decisions, like the ease of working in a particular location or the national-political implications of the choice? Are NGOs the do-gooders of popular imagination, or are NGO cynics correct in their claims that NGOs simply follow the money, the political desires of leaders, or their own personal comfort?
One can imagine several possible reasons on how NGOs might select particular places in which to implement their programs. For example, project locations could be chosen more or less at random -NGOs might throw a dart at a map to find a village or town in which to work.
Assuming this is not the case, several other plausible explanations exist. Selection may be based on extreme need, meaning that NGOs choose to work where there is the most poverty, illness, lack of education or no safe drinking water. Or NGOs might go where there are a great number of people in relative need. Perhaps they usually work where an individual NGO worker or leader has connections, or where their work won't be interfered with for political reasons. Along similar lines, it's plausible that NGOs are swayed by powerful national politicians, who influence the NGOs to work in their home area either by direct instruction, or because they can offer resources to the NGOs if they are willing to do so. Finally, it has been suggested that NGOs chose their location based on the conditions or comfort level in that place for the NGO workers themselves.
Case studies on this particular question are exceedingly rare, as few researchers have had access to comprehensive country-wide data indicating where NGOs implement their projects. I was able however, to gather sufficient information to answer this question as it pertains to Kenya by obtaining a complete database from the Government of Kenya's NGO Coordination Board (NGO Board), the government agency responsible for registering, monitoring and assessing NGOs' work in the country. This database not only lists each of the over 4000 NGOs operating in Kenya at the time of research, but provides information on which areas of the country they work. I use this data, combined with information from a wide variety of other government, international and non-governmental organization sources on Kenya, to determine which factors are most important in influencing an NGO's decision on where in the country to operate.
This chapter begins with an overview of existing theories of how NGOs chose the locations in which they work. This is followed by a discussion of the data and methods used in the analysis, as well as descriptions for each explanatory variable. It also corresponds to the reason that many highly educated people -both foreign and Kenya -give for their decision to work for an NGO. NGO workers in general have the skills and abilities to earn considerably higher incomes through employment in the private sector, but chose to work in NGOs for humanitarian or altruistic reasons. For example, one international NGO worker I interviewed said that she chose to take a 40% pay cut to work for a non-profit "because I really wanted to give back in some way… so [my] main reason is service and mission driven" (2008-3).
3 Another mid-level NGO worker told of "a personal interest to work on issues that I had an opinion about and cared for" . Many others told me their organizations hoped to reduce "duplication of efforts" in service provision in order to reach a greater number of people.
Another said, "We don't just talk about the bottom line. We get a chance to talk about why we are doing what we are doing, and debate what is the right thing to do" . Similarly, a
Kenyan education NGO manager told me that before she started her organization, she earned more money selling maize and beans meals in the shantytown, but she couldn't stand by and watch so many children remain uneducated . Likewise, a young Kenyan left a paying job to start an organization to keep boys in school and out of trouble in a highly turbulent slum in Nairobi. He relied only on donations to maintain the organization . These workers believe the organizations work where they do in order to improve the lives of those that truly need assistance.
Some recent scholarly research confirms these sentiments. In the international relations political science literature on norms, for example, Tim Büthe and his colleagues asked the question, "What explains the allocation of private-source development aid across recipient countries?" and found that American private development assistance is dispensed along needbased lines, following idealistic, altruistic and principled norms of serving underdeveloped and neglected populations (Büthe et al. 2008, 2) . It is not allocated in ways that serve primarily to aid the survival and self-perpetuation of the NGO or of the personnel working for the NGOs. In fact, they point out that "difficult work under often unpleasant conditions for quite low salaries leads to self-selection among the often highly educated NGO staff, so that those who make a career in development NGOs tend to be strongly motivated by a commitment to indeed feed the hungry, California, Berkeley, personal identifiers are not used. This interview numbering system allows the reader to understand that citations are from a wide variety of interview sources.
treat those in poor health, educate the illiterate, and to do so in ways that create conditions for long-term improvements in aid recipients' quality of life" (ibid. 4).
Should this "saintly" view of NGOs be true, we should expect to see a number of specific factors strongly correlated with high levels of NGO activity. Districts with high poverty and low human development should tend to have more NGOs, all else being equal. Similarly, poor health, education, sanitation and economic indicators should correspond to higher NGO penetration.
High population or population densities might also be associated with NGOs, since this would allow NGOs to do good for the greatest number of people.
The second category, the "cynical view of NGOs," is more often held by policy-makers, embittered NGO workers, donor country representatives, politicians, and critical academics.
Cynical views can fall into two sub-categories: political theories and convenience theories. These both suggest that NGOs provide services not where they are necessarily needed the most, but where there are instrumental reasons to provide them.
In the case of political theories, cynics tell several related stories. First, some suggest that NGOs are most plentiful in areas where powerful national politicians hail from, since African politicians are known to use their access to the national cake to feed their home areas (Ekeh 1975 , Jackson & Rosberg 1984 , Joseph 1987 , Bayart 1993 , van de Walle 2001 . NGOs have come to play a role in this distribution of benefits ever since "corruption" became the buzzword of the decade: national resources are frequently funneled through politician-initiated NGOs to sanitize them (Bratton 1989 , Fowler 1991 . A variant of this holds that NGOs are more prevalent in districts where elected politicians are most popular -or at least repeatedly reelected -since in a patronage-based political system, a politician will tend to be popular only if he/she delivers.
Thus areas displaying loyalty to the national government would be rewarded by the government not only helps these workers develop their community status as "patrons" (Kaler & Watkins 2001) , it also allows them to spend time with people they care about.
As with individual workers, NGOs as organizations may also choose to work where members of their organizational network or field works already, such as in a place where an organization with which they have successfully collaborated in the past already has a project.
Thus we might expect to see a snowballing of like-missioned organizations in one general area.
On the organizational level, many people have argued or implied that NGOs choose projects based primarily on the survival imperative of the organization itself -and less on the needs of the people they claim to help (Hancock 1989 , de Waal 1997 , Alexander Cooley and James Ron 2002 cited in Buthe et al. 2008 ). In the organization theory literature, this is addressed by theorists who claim that many organizations lose sight of their initial goals in order to survive. "Natural" systems theories of resource dependence, for example, would point out that
NGOs are dependent on their external donors for their survival. For this reason, an organization may choose to locate a project in an area that is important to the donor; that is highly visible in the news and therefore likely to receive funding from the populace generally; or that is "hot" in the development field. Each of these could help to ensure the organization's survival through success in accumulating resources needed for continuation.
If it is true that NGOs choose their location based on these convenience and livability factors, then certain correlations should hold. First, NGOs should be more prevalent in places that are easy to get to and where they can access a high density of people, all else being equal, meaning that one can expect to find NGOs along major highways, near well-trafficked airports, in areas with well-paved roads and larger cities, etc. Second, NGOs should be more common in areas where there is increased access to "elite goods," such as restaurants, entertainment facilities, imported or processed foodstuffs, resorts and high quality medical and education facilities for the families of these workers. Third, we should see a correlation between any stated interests of major donor countries and NGO location -although this might be more obvious between countries than within them. Finally, over time, we would expect to see a snowballing of NGOs in otherwise inexplicable locations. For example, in the town of Busia in Western Kenya there is a sizable community of academic workers that has largely formed via the snowball method. NGOs might prove to do the same thing. The NGO Board database includes a plethora of data on each organization. Basic information such as the NGO's name, ID number at the NGO Board, postal and physical address, contact information, and registration date exist alongside more interesting information like the organizational objectives, date of last return to the NGO Board, mission statement, origins, amounts, and spending patterns of organizational resources, and -most crucial for this papergeographical location. Specifically, the database includes information provided by each NGO on which districts in Kenya it works or will work.
Data & Methods
As a caveat, I recognize that while this database is remarkably complete, there are, not surprisingly, several factors whose existence suggests that the data might not be flawless.
Specifically, some of the NGOs listed have not submitted required annual reports consistently since they were first registered, meaning it is unclear whether the organization still operates generally, and in the location listed specifically. Since the NGO Coordination Board does not have adequate staff to follow up with each of these organizations, many of them are left in the database in years that reports are not submitted, giving the organization the benefit of the doubtit, too, is likely lacking in administrative resources. Yet as already mentioned the NGO Board has struck many organizations from the register over the years, suggesting that there is a strong attempt at maintenance of the database.
An equally problematic element in the database is that it relies on self-reported location information from the NGOs. This means that the database lists the districts where each organization says that it works, but not where the NGO can actually be shown to work now or in the past. Because a good number of NGOs register but never get off the ground, or their strategy changes between registration and implementation, it is not always clear that they ever actually had a presence in the places listed in the database. Moreover, it is unclear whether the location information is updated each time an annual report is submitted, or whether it is entered once, at the time of initial registration, and never updated.
Nevertheless, I use the data. I argue that this data can be used despite these potential errors since: it is far and away the most comprehensive dataset available for the country; it is the data that the Kenyan government uses to determine NGO-related policies and regulations for the country; it is updated as well as possible, given the Board's capacity 5 , with inactive NGOs removed each year from the registry; and it holds up to tests of robustness when compared with alternate, smaller datasets. Specifically, as shown later in this chapter, results from this the data are robust against those of the Directory of NGOs in Kenya (2005) , from the non-profit organization responsible for coordinating all NGOs in Kenya, the NGO Council. While the absolute number of NGOs in Kenya is not consistent between the two organizations, the variable 5 While I mention the NGO Board's limited capacity, I believe that this is more due to a lack in the number of personnel, rather than the quality of personnel. The NGO Board workers, relative to most other Kenyan government agencies I visited, were extremely professional, motivated, interested in their work, and willing to assist my research as well as they could. Board employees themselves recognized their own resource scarcity and did not cover up or attempt to hide limitations in their work.
of interest to this paper, geographic distribution of NGOs, is highly correlated, at .9478.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that any errors that may exist in the database were placed there intentionally or in any systematically biasing manner. Thus, while there are most certainly errors -as there are with all statistics and with any statistic from a developing country in particular -there is no reason that the errors are biased in any systematic way. assistance determines NGO placements, we should see a significant positive coefficient for lack of access to drinking water and health care, high HIV prevalence and adult illiteracy. These 6 I do not use a proxy for "poverty" generally, as many of the poverty indicators, such as that used in the UN Human Development Reports, are composite indices combining several factors. I choose to tease out these individual factors for greater precision. While it might be useful to do so, I do not include GDP per capita or other measure of wealth either, as this is both highly correlated with several other measures included in the models (such as urbanization, population density and road density) and can be a distorted measure in places with very high income disparity.
represent the need for infrastructure, health care, assistance responding to the HIV epidemic, and education respectively. In four representative sample districts (Machakos, Mbeere, Taita Taveta and Siaya) for which I analyzed the NGO focus area, the distribution of NGOs was virtually identical. Using Machakos as an example, the distribution of NGOs' foci is as follows: 40% general development and poverty reduction; 19% issues pertaining to women, children, youth or disabled people; 12% health; 11% education; 6% environmental issues; 4% agriculture; 4% governance issues like civic education, human rights or corruption; 1% emergency relief, and 3% other. Thus over 90% of NGOs are focusing on poverty reduction in some fashion or another. Even many environmental NGOs' mission statements profess to want to address issues such as drought and deforestation because they negatively impact poverty reduction efforts. NGOs chose location based on ease of access, we should see a strongly positive and significant 9 While constituencies are a political unit and districts are an administrative unit, they overlap, such that multiple constituencies (between two and eight, depending on the district) are contained within the district boundaries. 10 I have not yet come up with a measurement for powerful politicians coming from a particular district, given the lack of statistically significant correlation for the other two political variables, I'm not convinced it's worth devising. I also chose not to examine the theory that NGO placement is based on the interests of specific donor countries or popular views of "important" districts. I made these decisions strategically, based on the research and results Büthe et al. (2008) found for a similar question internationally -they did not find any correlation between portrayal in the news and NGO funding between countries. I feel that I am even less likely to do so within a country. 11 It has been suggested that the proportion of students attending secondary school in a district would also be a good measure for convenience, as it indicates whether there is a pool of educated people from which to draw NGO personnel. Because of the national centralized nature of the school system in Kenya, however, students often attend secondary school -usually boarding school -outside of their home district, meaning that enrollment rates are not an entirely accurate measure for this.
coefficient on the paved roads variables, and a negative coefficient on the district's distance from Nairobi.
As a measure of physical comfort and quality of life for NGO workers, I examine the urbanization level of the district, since urban areas are known to have significantly higher levels of elite goods than their rural counterparts all over the world -and perhaps magnified in Africa.
The urbanization variable is calculated as a ratio of the urban population of the district to the entire district population, based on the 1999 Kenya Government census. If it is true that NGOs chose their operating locations based on their employee's convenience, we should see a positive and significant coefficient on this variable.
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Analysis of NGO Placement
With this data in hand, I am able to now determine which factors correlate with the geographic distribution of NGOs in Kenya at the district level, all else being equal. I begin with a basic model (Model 1 in Table Two Most NGOs claim to locate based on objective need. To cover a variety of types of need, I include measures for education, infrastructure and health care generally, represented by adult illiteracy, lack of access to clean drinking water and lack of access to health care respectively. Interestingly, two of these independent measures of need have very little impact on the model. The first, adult illiteracy, is never remotely statistically significant (p-values of .279, .313, .897 and .799 in Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively). Moreover, the coefficients on the statistically significant variables barely change when it is discard in Model 5. While I do not include all models attempted here, I never found adult illiteracy to be statistically significant -its significance only decreased as I added other measures. As an alternate measure, I used primary school enrollment rates in the model in the place of adult illiteracy. I use the UNDP's Human Development Report for Kenya (2006), which estimates the school-age population from the 1999 census relative to the enrollment figures. 13 This measure was always insignificant.
Like adult illiteracy, the second additional measure of need, the percent of people in a district without access to clean drinking water, which can be seen both as a measures of absolute poverty and as one of need for infrastructure services, proves not to be a significant determinant of NGO presence. Additionally, it had a coefficient with the "wrong" sign: while the theory implies that as the percentage of people without safe water goes up the number of NGOs in a district should also go up, the results in Table two this may at first seem to be the same thing as lack of access to health care since they both pertain to illness, in fact the two are correlated at an extremely low level (.01). Rates of HIV infection have little to do with health care coverage, since HIV cannot be cured and its spread is largely unrelated with treatable medical conditions. Thus, I include them both in the model. As seen in Table 2 , the estimated coefficient for HIV prevalence is positive and statistically significant, as hypothesized. Clearly, need factors -particularly those pertaining to availability of social services and the HIV epidemic -are explanatory factors in determining NGO placement.
Like some of the need factors, convenience factors have a highly significant impact on NGO placement in Kenya. To test the convenience hypothesis, I chose the district headquarter distance from Nairobi as a measure, since, on average, the farther one gets from Nairobi, the less well-maintained the roads are -and therefore the more pain involved in getting there and the fewer the elite goods traveling along those roads. This measure is also the "convenience" factor least correlated with any other possible convenience measures. For the most part, throughout the models, this variable is strongly significant with consistent substantive meaning.
Because many of my convenience measures are fairly highly correlated with one another (but not with the district headquarters' distance from Nairobi) and all represent access to a high number of people as well, I alternate these measures throughout the models to confirm that convenience factors do play a role in determining NGO placement. 14 I include only one additional proxy measure at a time. Thus, in Models 1 and 2, I include an urbanization measure, which is highly significant (p-value of .000 in both models). In Model 3, I exchange urbanization for the density of paved roads in the area. My coefficient on the road density variable is highly statistically significant (p-value of .000) and has the sign predicted by the convenience theory. It suggests that as the road density in a district increases, the number of NGOs in the district increases, all else being equal. Because I believe population levels and densities to be the clearest pull-factor for ease of access by NGOs, I include a measure of population density in the final models. Like the other convenience measures, population density is strongly significant and positive (p-value remaining .000 in both models). I discuss the substantive meaning of this finding below. coefficients, nor significance levels, nor the fit (r-squared) of the model in a meaningful way.
Political motivations or pressures are not the reason that NGOs chose their project or office locations in Kenya.
In Table Three In meaningful terms, I find that both need and convenience variables play a large role in the determination of NGO locations in a district. For example, for each standard deviation (13.8%) increase in the percentage of people without access to health care, we find approximately 10 more NGOs in the district. Likewise, the estimated coefficients for the HIV variable suggests that for each standard deviation increase in HIV prevalence in a district -or about 4.6% increase in prevalence -we find an increase of approximately 9 NGOs in a district.
Stated another way, as we move from a district with the median HIV prevalence in the country (4.05% HIV prevalence) to one at the 75 th percentile HIV rate (6.7%), we find an increase of approximately 5 NGOs, all else being equal. In real terms, this is equal to about a quarter of 1 standard deviation in NGO number.
Similarly, while less significant than HIV prevalence, the estimated coefficient for my convenience measurements, HQ distance from Nairobi, implies that for each standard deviation increase in the distance of a district's headquarters from Nairobi, we find approximately 11 fewer organizations, all else being equal. This means that being located only 190km (114 miles)
away from Nairobi results in a district having almost dozen fewer NGOs than average. I find that holding all else constant, a one standard deviation increase in the population density of a district (493 people per square km) leads to an increase in the number of NGOs for that district of 28. Stated another way, as we moved from a district with the median level of population density (164 people/km2) to a district at the 75 th percentile rate of population density (323 people/km2), we find an increase of 9 NGOs in that district. 
Tests of Robustness
Using an alternate measure of NGOs, the data from the National Council of NGOs, itself an umbrella NGO responsible for non-governmental coordinating NGO activities, we find that the major results hold, as shown in Table Four . While HIV prevalence, one of the variables representing the need hypothesis, is no longer significant, the other key indicator of need that was significant using the first database, lack of access to health care, remains strongly significant. Likewise, both of the measures of convenience that were significant using the first database remain so. Most importantly, there is no indication that the political hypothesis needs to be reconsidered when this new data is employed. Thus we can be confident in our results. 
Areas of Further Inquiry
This paper represents a first-pass attempt to address NGO location in an Africa developing country, and does not aim to be the concluding view on the matter. Already, space for additional research presents itself. For example, the author is currently working to identify whether an organization's primary area of involvement makes a difference for this findings. Do we find that NGOs focusing on health issues are drawn to areas with peculiar characteristics, while other NGOs -like environmental NGOs -are drawn by different characteristics? Do health NGOs go to malaria and HIV zones, while education NGOs go to places with low adult literacy? Likewise, one might be able to develop more precise measures of political influence or interference. One reviewer suggests that perhaps the Presidential Administration during which an NGO registered might be correlated with the districts that are loyal to that administration, and this deserves further consideration. Another Kenyan colleague pointed to the fact that high-level administrators' home districts might be unusually favored, if not always deliberately. He sited an example in which a then-unknown UK-based NGO approached the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Services to ask where they were needed. According to the story, because the NGO positioned itself as a child-welfare organization and not a development organization at a time when development projects were in demand, the PS had trouble garnering excitement for its work. As a result, he instructed the NGO to go to his home district to work, since he could influence the District Development Committee to welcome them . Developing a measure of the role of this type of non-elected "influential elites" might shed more light on the politics of NGO placement.
Similarly, several reviewers have commented that whether the organization is an "international" or "local" NGO might influence the results. While the author feels that this distinction makes little empirical sense in the Kenyan context, where nearly all registered NGOs receive the vast majority of their funds from non-Kenyan/international sources and an alternate registration category exists for truly "local" organizations or community groups, it is possible that in other contexts, this distinction will provide analytically useful. 15 Alternatively, future papers might examine specific sources of funds by country of origin and by whether funds come from private or public sources.
Finally, while this chapter gives us a valuable snapshot of where NGOs report to be working, future research should examine changes in NGO locations over time. This would provide greater insight into such things as whether organizations are, in fact, snowballingchoosing to locate where their NGO compatriots are working already -and whether they follow "hot spots" in need, as might happen after a natural disaster or political instability resulting in refugees. It might also settle the question of the role of influential actors in NGO placement, as
we could determine such things as whether the promotion of such individuals to high position correlates with increased NGO numbers in that or following years in their home districts. According to the findings from a range of models, NGOs in Kenya appear to pick districts in which to work for two reasons: first, they go where they are needed, largely to fight health-related issues, particularly HIV/AIDS and where service provision infrastructure is 15 The author finds this distinction analytically invalid in the Kenyan context, as nearly every representative of an organization registered as an NGO that she interviewed to in the course of her research reported receiving the bulk of their funds from abroad, meaning that foreign donors had the opportunity to influence areas of involvement for nearly all organizations equally, not only those that are headquartered in another country. Moreover, nearly all "international" NGOs have a staff that is 95% or more Kenyan, making them quite "local". And since a formal registration process exists for local organizations that do fundraising internally and aim for self-help and development goals (they register as membership societies through the Ministry of Gender, Culture and Social Services under the Societies Act), the author feels that organizations registered as NGOs in Kenya should all be considered as one type in the international-local dichotomy. "potholes" impassible to all but four-wheel-drive vehicles, progressing gingerly through the pock-marked "pavement" at speeds under 10km/hour so as not to lose an axle or tire). Yet, an equally plausible explanation should be considered: NGOs may strategically place their projects in areas with high population density, high road network density, and access to goods and resources so that they can positively affect the greatest possible number with their single organization. While the placement of NGOs near elite goods may also indicate that NGO workers are not themselves all ascetic altruists, it is likely that having even minimal convenience goods draws a higher quality of worker to the NGO field location. Just as the World Bank and other "elite" development organizations argue that they need to pay top-dollar salaries in order to attract the most promising candidates from first-rank universities (but still pay less than comparable jobs in the private sector), NGOs may find that they need to provide some level of physical comfort to their workers in order to entice them into the field. For this reason, it is plausible that need factors are the primary motivation for NGO placement, but that realistic considerations of how to achieve the greatest impact with the highest quality workers also play a large role. As one NGO leader in Machakos District (70km from Nairobi) reported, the organization, which registered in Kenya in 1996, chose to locate in Machakos during its expansion both because poverty levels, HIV/AIDS along the Mombasa Road (the road from Nairobi to the coastal port town of Mombasa), and unemployed youth rates were high, but also because "Machakos is not too far… its easy to coordinate with [our offices in] Nairobi" ).
Conclusions: Pragmatic Saints in Kenya
This conclusion is consistent with the organization theory literature on goal displacement, in which the means used to achieve a goal inadvertently become more important than the goal itself, or additional goals are adopted. In this case, the initial goal (drawn from need factors) appears to be retained, but these other, practical goals are also included. In the case of NGO placement, I argue that convenience matters primarily as a mean of better achieving the stated need-oriented, altruistic goals of the NGOs. Thus, it might appear as though NGOs are considered with personal comfort, but only as a means of better achieving their initial needfulfilling goal. This is consistent with interviews with NGO workers, who reported such things as: "Money was not at all a consideration for me wanting… to work in the NGO domain, but I do value being compensated accordingly for my experience" and "money wasn't critical, but I feel that I STAYED with [the organization] because despite being a non-profit, it was a place where I could grow professionally, and feel stable.
[It] provides health insurance, 401 K, competitive salaries, and many extra perks" (2008-2). While these two quotes come from Americans working in the development field, clearly NGO workers have a realistic side regarding compensation and convenience goods.
Another conclusion we can begin to draw from this data is that patronage politics may not hold as much sway as is often cynically said in Kenya. In no model were political factors shown to have a statistically and substantively significant impact on NGO placement in the country. Neither allegiance to the national government via electoral support for either Moi or Kibaki, nor fidelity to MPs in the district appeared to have any impact on NGO placement in that location. While it is possible -indeed probable -that MPs influence some proportion of NGOs to work in their district, there's no evidence of a primarily patronage-based storyline, in which prolonged fidelity to a single person results in greater NGO assistance. In a country where patronage and corruption are considered the name of the game, this is a substantial finding.
Finally, and importantly for the remainder of this dissertation, we can conclude from the foregoing analysis that NGOs do not appear to be choosing to locate themselves in areas where there is no state. They tend to be more prevalence where the state is also strongest -nearer to the capital city, in cities rather than rural areas, etc. Contrary to popular and oft cited claims that
NGOs are "replacing the state," we instead find that NGOs are complementing the state. This claim will be examined in considerable detail in the chapters to follow, which suggest that in many ways NGOs are replacing only the organizational form, or implementing agency of the state, but not its legitimacy, authority, or ability to govern.
